This paper discusses an alternative to conditioning that may be used when the probability distribution is not fully specified. It does not require any assumptions (such as CAR: coarsening at random) on the unknown distribution. The well-known Monty Hall problem is the simplest scenario where neither naive conditioning nor the CAR assumption suffice to determine an updated probability distribution. This paper thus addresses a generalization of that problem to arbitrary distributions on finite outcome spaces, arbitrary sets of 'messages', and (almost) arbitrary loss functions, and provides existence and characterization theorems for robust probability updating strategies. We find that for logarithmic loss, optimality is characterized by an elegant condition, which we call RCAR (reverse coarsening at random). Under certain conditions, the same condition also characterizes optimality for a much larger class of loss functions, and we obtain an objective and general answer to how one should update probabilities in the light of new information.
Introduction
There are many situations in which a decision maker receives incomplete data and still has to reach conclusions about these data. One type of incomplete data is coarse data: instead of the real outcome of a random event, the decision maker observes a subset of the possible outcomes, and knows only that the actual outcome is an element of this subset. An example frequently occurs in questionnaires, where people may be asked if their date of birth lies between 1950 and 1960 or between 1960 and 1970 et cetera. Their exact year of birth is unknown to us, but at least we now know for sure in which decade they are born. We introduce a simple and concrete motivating instance of coarse data with the following example.
In Example A we have seen that standard conditioning does not always give the correct answers. Heitjan and Rubin [3] answer the question under what circumstances standard conditioning of coarse data is correct. They discovered a necessary and sufficient condition of the coarsening mechanism, called coarsening at random (CAR). A coarsening mechanism satisfies the CAR condition if, for each subset y of the outcomes, the probability of choosing to report y is the same no matter which outcome x ∈ y is the true outcome. It depends on the arrangement of possible revealed subsets whether a coarsening mechanism exists that satisfies CAR. It holds automatically if the subsets that can be revealed partition the sample space. As noted by Grünwald and Halpern [4] however, as soon as events overlap, there exist distributions on the space for which CAR does not hold. In many such situations it even cannot hold; see Gill and Grünwald [5] for a complete characterization of the -quite restricted -set of situations in which CAR can hold. No coarsening mechanism satisfies the CAR condition for Example A.
We hasten to add that we neither question the validity of conditioning nor do we want to replace it by something else. The real problem lies not with conditioning, but with conditioning within the wrong sample space, in which the coarsening mechanism cannot be represented. If we had a distribution P on the correct, larger space, which allows for statements like 'the probability is α that I choose {1, 2, 3, 4} to reveal if the outcome is 3', then conditioning would give the correct results. The problem with coarse data is though that we often do not have enough information to identify Pe.g. we do not know the value of α and do not want to assume that it is 1/2. Henceforth, we shall refer to conditioning in the overly simple space as 'naive conditioning'. In this paper we propose update rules for situations in which naive conditioning gives the wrong answer, and conditioning in the right space is problematic because the un-derlying distribution is partially unknown. These are invariably situations in which two or more of the potentially observed events overlap.
We illustrate this further with a famously counter-intuitive example: the Monty Hall puzzle, posed by Selvin [6] and popularized years later in Ask Marilyn, a weekly column in Parade Magazine by Marilyn vos Savant [7] .
Example B (Monty Hall). Suppose you are on a game show and you may choose one of three doors. Behind one of the doors a car can be found, but the other two only hide a goat. Initially the car is equally likely to be behind each of the doors. After you have picked one of the doors, the host Monty Hall, who knows the location of the prize, will open one of the other doors, revealing a goat. Now you are asked if you would like to switch from the door you chose to the other unopened door. Is it a good idea to switch?
At this moment we will not answer this question, but we show that the problem of choosing whether to switch doors is an example of the coarse data problem. The unknown random value we are interested in is the location of the car: one of the three doors. When the host opens a door different from the one you picked, revealing a goat, this is equivalent to reporting a subset. The subset he reports is the set of the two doors that are still closed. For example, if he opens door 2, this tells us that the true value, the location of the car, is in the subset {1, 3}. Note that if you have by chance picked the correct door, there are two possible doors Monty Hall can open, so also two subsets he can report. This implies that Monty has a choice in reporting a subset. How does Monty's coarsening mechanism influence your prediction of the true location of the car?
The CAR condition can only be satisfied for very particular distributions of where the prize is: the probability that the prize is hidden behind the initially chosen door must be either 0 or 1, otherwise no CAR coarsening mechanism exists [4, Example 3.3] 1 . If the prize is hidden in any other way, for example uniformly at random as we assume, then CAR cannot hold, and naive conditioning will result in an incorrect conclusion for at least one of the two subsets.
Examples A and B are just two instances of a more general problem: the number of outcomes may be arbitrary; the initial distribution of the true outcome may be any distribution; and the subsets of outcomes that may be reported to the decision maker may be any family of sets. Our goal is to define general procedures that tell us how to update the probabilities of the outcomes after making a coarse observation, in such situations where naive conditioning is not adequate. We are aiming for modular methods that do not enforce a particular interpretation of probability. In Example A, we saw "objective" probabilities: the original distributions were known, and the updated probabilities we found could again be interpreted as frequencies over many repetitions of the same experiment. The original distribution of the outcomes could however also express a subjective prior belief of how likely each outcome is. For example, in Example B, the uniform distribution of the location of the car requires an assumption on the frequent-ist's part, while it may be a reasonable choice of prior for a subjective Bayesian [9] . In this case, the updated probabilities after a coarse observation take the role of the Bayesian posterior distribution. In any case, we will refer to the initial probability of an outcome, regardless of observations, as the marginal probability.
Without any assumptions on the quizmaster's strategy (i.e. the coarsening mechanism), the conditional distributions of outcomes given observations will be unknown, and this uncertainty cannot be fully expressed by a single probability distribution over the outcomes. One way to deal with this is by means of imprecise probability, i.e. by explicitly tracking all possible quizmaster strategies and their effects [10] . We however focus on obtaining a single (precise) updated probability. To get such a single answer, we could make some assumption about how the quizmaster chooses his strategy. Assuming that the coarsening mechanism satisfies CAR is one such approach, but as we saw in the two examples, there are scenarios where this assumption cannot hold. We instead take a worst-case approach, treating the coarsening of the observation and the subsequent probability update as a game between two players: the quizmaster and the contestant (named for their roles in the Monty Hall scenario). The subset of outcomes communicated by the quizmaster to the contestant will be called the message.
In this fictional game, the quizmaster's goal is the opposite of the contestant's, namely to make predicting the true outcome as hard as possible for the contestant. This type of zero-sum game, in which some information is revealed to the contestant was also considered by Grünwald and Halpern [11] and Ozdenoren and Peck [12] . Such situations are rare in practice: The sender of a message might be motivated by interests other than informing us (for example, a newspaper may be trying to optimize its sales figures, or a company may want to present its performance in the best light), but rarely by trying to be as uninformative as possible (though see Section 5.5, where we consider the case that the players' goals are not diametrically opposed). In other situations, the 'sender' might not be a rational being at all, but just some unknown process. Yet this game is a useful way to look at the problem of updating our probabilities even if we do not believe that the coarsening mechanism is chosen adversarially: if we simply do not know how 'nature' chooses which message to give us and do not want to make any assumptions about this, then choosing the worst-case (or minimax) optimal probability update as defined here guarantees that we incur at most some fixed expected loss, while any other probability update may lead to a larger expected loss depending on the unknown coarsening mechanism. While from a Bayesian point of view, such a choice might at first seem overly pessimistic, we note that in all cases we consider, our approach is fully consistent with a Bayesian one -our results can be interpreted as recommending a certain prior on the quizmaster's assignment of messages to outcomes, which in simple cases (such as Monty Hall) coincides with a prior that Bayesians would be tempted to adopt as well.
We will employ a loss function to measure how well the quizmaster and the contestant are doing at this game. Our results apply to a wide variety of loss functions. For an analysis of the Monty Hall game, 0-1 loss would be appropriate, as the contestant must choose a single door; this is the approach used by Gill [9] and Gnedin [13] . Other loss functions, such as logarithmic loss and Brier loss (see e.g. Grünwald and Dawid [14] ), also allow the contestant to formulate their prediction of where the prize is hidden as an arbitrary probability distribution over the outcomes.
We model probability updating as a game as follows. An outcome x is drawn with known marginal probability p x and shown to the quizmaster, who picks a consistent message y x using his coarsening mechanism P(y | x). Seeing only y, the contestant makes a prediction in the form of a probability mass function Q(· | y) on outcomes. Then x is revealed and the prediction quality measured using the loss function L. The quizmaster/contestant aim to maximize/minimize the expected loss 
For the Monty Hall game with logarithmic or Brier, i.e. squared loss, the worst-case optimal answer for the contestant is to put probability 1/3 on his initially chosen door and 2/3 on the other door. (These probabilities agree with the literature on the Monty Hall game.) Surprisingly, we will see (in Example D on page 17) that for very similar games, logarithmic and Brier loss may lead to two different answers! We will find that for finite outcome spaces, both players in our game have worstcase optimal strategies for many loss functions: the quizmaster has a strategy that makes the contestant's prediction task as hard as possible, and the contestant has a strategy that is guaranteed to give good predictions no matter how the quizmaster coarsens. We give characterizations that allow us to recognize such strategies, for different conditions on the loss functions.
Example A (continued). For logarithmic loss, the worst-case optimal prediction of the die roll conditional on the revealed subset is found with the help of Theorem 10. The worst-case optimal prediction given that you observe the set {1, 2, 3, 4} is: predict outcomes 1 and 2 each with probability 1/3, and predict 3 and 4 each with probability 1/6. Symmetrically, given that you observe the set {3, 4, 5, 6}, the worst-case optimal prediction is: 3 and 4 with probability 1/6, and 5 and 6 with probability 1/3.
These probabilities correspond with the uniform coarsening mechanism given earlier. However, it is a good prediction even if you do not know what coarsening mechanism I am using. An intuitive argument for this is the following: If I wanted, I could use a very extreme coarsening mechanism, always choosing to reveal the set {1, 2, 3, 4} when the die comes up 3 or 4. But this is balanced by the possibility that I might be using the opposite coarsening mechanism, which always reveals {3, 4, 5, 6} if the result is 3 or 4. The worst-case optimal prediction given above hedges against both possibilities.
Overview of contents
In Section 2, we will give a precise definition of the 'conditioning game' we described. In Section 3, we find general conditions on the loss function under which worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and contestant exist, and we characterize such strategies. (See Figure 3 for a visual illustration of the concepts used in this section.) If stronger conditions hold, worst-case optimal strategies for both players may be easier to recognize. This is explored for two classes of loss functions in Section 4; in particular, we find that for local proper loss functions (among which logarithmic loss), worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized by a simple condition on their probabilities that we call the RCAR (reverse CAR) condition. RCAR bears a striking similarity to CAR, but with the roles of outcomes and messages interchanged. Also, by Lemma 14, if a betting game is played repeatedly and the contestant is allowed to distribute investments over different outcomes and to reinvest all capital gained so far in each round, then the same strategy is optimal, regardless of the pay-offs! An overview of the theorems and the conditions under which they apply is given in Table 1 on page 13 .
Then in Section 5 we look at the influence of the set of available messages, imposing only the minimal symmetry requirement on the loss function. We prove that for graph and matroid games (and only these) the optimality condition is again RCAR. As RCAR is independent of the loss function, for such games probability updating can hence be meaningfully defined and performed completely agnostic of the task at hand. Many examples are included to illustrate (the limits of) the theoretical results. Section 6 gives some concluding remarks. An overview of the results in this work is presented in Figure 1 . All proofs are given in Appendix A.
Highlight. A central feature of probability distributions is that they summarize what a decision maker would do under a variety of circumstances (loss functions): for each particular loss function the decision maker minimizes expected loss (maximizes utility) using the same distribution no matter what specific loss function is used. Since we generalize conditioning by using a minimax approach, one might expect that for different loss functions one ends up with different updated probabilities. Still, we show that for a rich selection of scenarios optimality is characterized by the RCAR condition, which is independent of the loss function. As a result, our updated probabilities are application-independent, and we may hence think of them -if we are willing to take a cautious (minimax) approach -as expressing what an experimenter should believe after having received the data.
We isolate two distinct classes of scenarios where such application independence obtains. First, games with graph and matroid message sets (extending Monty Hall) and symmetric loss functions. Second, graphs with arbitrary message sets and proper local loss functions, including the symmetric logarithmic loss as well as its asymmetric generalizations appropriate for Kelly gambling with arbitrary payoffs. In these scenarios our application-independent update rule has an objective appeal, and we feel that its importance may transcend that of being "merely" minimax optimal.
This work is an extension of Feenstra [2] to loss functions other than logarithmic loss, and to the case where the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster assigns probability 0 to some combinations of outcomes x and messages y with x ∈ y. It can also be seen as a concrete application of the ideas in Grünwald and Dawid [14] about minimax optimal decision making and its relation to entropy. A more extensive discussion of worst-case optimal probability updating can be found in Van Ommen [1] ; in particular, there the question of efficient algorithms for determining worst-case optimal strategies is also considered.
Definitions and problem formulation
A (probability updating) game G is defined as a quadruple (X, Y, p, L), where X is a finite set, Y is a family of distinct subsets of X with y∈Y y = X, p is a strictly positive probability mass function on X, and L is a function L : X×∆ X → [0, ∞], where ∆ X is the set of all probability mass functions on X. We call X the outcome space, Y the message structure, p the marginal distribution, and L the loss function. It is clear that outcomes with zero marginal probability p do not contribute to the objective (1), so we may exclude them without loss of generality. Let us illustrate these definitions by applying them to our example.
Example B (continued). We assume the car is hidden uniformly at random behind one of the three doors. With this assumption, we can abstract away the initial choice of a door by the contestant: by symmetry, we can assume without loss of generality that he always picks door 2. Then the probability updating game starts with the quizmaster opening door 1 or 3, thereby giving the message "the car is behind door 2 or 3" or "the car is behind door 1 or 2", respectively. This can be expressed as follows in our formalization:
• outcome space X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 };
• message space Y = {y 1 , y 2 } with y 1 = {x 1 , x 2 } and y 2 = {x 2 , x 3 };
If a loss function L is also given, this fully specifies a game. One example is randomized 0-1 loss, which is given by L(x, Q) = 1−Q(x). Here x is the true outcome, and Q is the contestant's prediction of the true outcome in the form of a probability distribution. Thus the prediction Q is awarded a smaller loss if it assigned a larger probability Q(x) to the outcome x that actually obtained. We will see other examples of loss functions in Section 2.2.
A function from some finite set S to the reals R = (−∞, ∞) corresponds to an |S |-dimensional vector when we fix an order on the elements of S . We write R S for the set of such functions/vectors. Even if no order on S is specified, this allows us to apply concepts from linear algebra to R S without ambiguity. For example, we may say that 7 some set is an affine subspace of R S . (This identification and the resulting notation are also used by Schrijver [15] .)
Using this correspondence, we identify the elements of ∆ X with the |X|-dimensional vectors in the unit simplex, though we use ordinary function notation P(x) for its elements. The probability mass function p that is part of a game's definition is also a vector in ∆ X . Vector notation p x will be used to refer to its elements to set p apart from P, which will denote distributions chosen by the quizmaster rather than fixed by the game.
For any message y ⊆ X, we define ∆ y = {P ∈ ∆ X | P(x) = 0 for x y}. Note that these are vectors of the same length as those in ∆ X , though contained within a lower-dimensional affine subspace.
A loss function L is called proper if P ∈ arg min Q∈∆ X E X∼P L(X, Q) for all P ∈ ∆ X , and strictly proper if this minimizer is unique (this is standard terminology; see for instance Gneiting and Raftery [16] ). Thus if a predicting agent believes the true distribution of an outcome to be given by some P, such a loss function will encourage him to report Q = P as his prediction.
Strategies
Strategies for the players are specified by conditional distributions: a strategy P for the quizmaster consists of distributions on Y, one for each possible x ∈ X, and a strategy Q for the contestant consists of distributions on X, one for each possible y ∈ Y. These strategies define how the two players act in any situation: the quizmaster's strategy defines how he chooses a message containing the true outcome (the coarsening mechanism), and the contestant's strategy defines his prediction for each message he might receive.
We write P(· | x) for the distribution on Y the quizmaster plays when the true outcome is x ∈ X. Because p x > 0, this conditional distribution can be recovered from the joint P(x, y) := P(y | x)p x ; we will use this joint distribution to specify a strategy for the quizmaster. If P(y) := x∈y P(x, y) > 0, we may also write P(· | y) for the vector in ∆ y given by P(x | y) := P(x, y)/P(y). No such rewrites can be made for Q, as no marginal Q(y) is specified by the game or by the strategy Q. To shorten notation and to emphasize that Q is not a joint distribution, we write Q |y rather than Q(· | y) for the distribution that the contestant plays in response to message y.
We restrict the quizmaster to conditional distributions P for which P(y | x) = 0 if x y; that is, he may not 'lie' to the contestant. We make no similar requirement on the contestant's choice of Q, though for proper loss functions, and in fact all other loss functions we will consider in our examples, the contestant can gain nothing from using a strategy Q for which Q |y (x) > 0 where x y.
Example B (continued). The table to the right specifies all aspects of a game except for its loss function: its outcome space (here, for the Monty Hall game, X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }), message space (Y = {y 1 , y 2 } with y 1 = {x 1 , x 2 } and y 2 = {x 2 , x 3 }) and marginal distribution (p uniform on X). In this table we have filled in a strategy P for the quizmaster in 8 the form of a joint distribution on pairs of x and y. The cells in the table where x y are marked with a dash to indicate that P may not assign positive probability there. The probabilities in each column sum to the marginal probabilities at the bottom, so this joint distribution P has the correct marginal distribution on the outcomes. For this particular strategy, if the true outcome is x 2 , the quizmaster will give message y 1 or y 2 to the contestant with equal probability.
More formally, write R(X, Y) as an abbreviation for the set of pairs {(x, y) | y ∈ Y, x ∈ y}. In the case of the Monty Hall game, there are four such pairs:
represents the set of all functions from R(X, Y) to R ≥0 . If P is an element of this set and (x, y) ∈ R(X, Y), the value of P at (x, y) is denoted by P(x, y). For (x, y) with x y, the notation P(x, y) does not correspond to a value of the function, but is taken to be 0.
We again identify the elements of R
with vectors. Thus the mass function P shown in (2) is identified with a four-element vector ( 1 /3, 1 /6, 1 /6, 1 /3). (We could have chosen a different ordering instead.)
We define the set P of strategies for the quizmaster as {P ∈ R R(X,Y) ≥0
| y x P(x, y) = p x for all x}; this is a convex set. The set of strategies for the contestant is
For given strategies P and Q, the expected loss the contestant incurs (1) is
We allow L to take the value ∞; if this value occurs with positive probability, then the contestant's expected loss is infinite. However, for terms where the probability is zero, we define 0 · ∞ = 0, as is consistent with measure-theoretic probability. We model the probability updating problem as a zero-sum game between two players with objective (3): the quizmaster chooses P ∈ P to maximize (3), while simultaneously (that is, without knowing P) the contestant chooses Q ∈ Q to minimize that quantity. The game (X, Y, p, L) is common knowledge for the two players.
If the contestant knew the quizmaster's strategy, he would pick a strategy Q that for each y minimizes the expected loss of predicting x given y. When the contestant receives a message and knows the distribution P ∈ ∆ X over the outcomes given that message, this expected loss is written as
This is the generalized entropy of P for loss function L [14] . (Note that in the preceding display, P and Q are not strategies but simply distributions over X.) If the contestant picks his strategy Q this way, (3) becomes the expected generalized entropy of the quizmaster's strategy P ∈ P:
where we again define terms with P(y) = 0 as 0. We say a strategy P is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster if it maximizes this expected generalized entropy over all P ∈ P. We call the version of the game where the quizmaster has to play first the maximin game, where the order of the words 'max' and 'min' reflects the order in which they appear in the expression for the value of this game as well as the order in which the maximizing and minimizing players take their turns. Similarly, if the contestant were to play first (the minimax game), his goal might be to find a strategy Q that minimizes his worst-case expected loss
(In this case, the maximum is always achieved so we can write max rather than sup: for each x, the quizmaster can choose P that puts all mass on a y x with the maximum loss.) We call a strategy worst-case optimal for the contestant if it achieves the minimum of (6).
It is an elementary result from game theory that if worst-case optimal strategies P * and Q * exist for the two players, their expected losses are related by
[17, Lemma 36.1: "maximin ≤ minimax"]. The inequality expresses that in a sequential game where one of the players knows the other's strategy before choosing his own, the player to move second may have an advantage. In the next section, we will see that in many probability updating games, worst-case optimal strategies for both players exist (but may not be unique), and the maximum expected generalized entropy equals the minimum worst-case expected loss:
When this is the case, we say that the minimax theorem holds [18, 19] . We remark here that our setting, while a zero-sum game, differs from the usual setting of zero-sum games in some respects: We consider possibly infinite loss and (in general) infinite sets of strategies available to the players, but do not allow the players to randomize over these strategies. Randomizing over P would not give the quizmaster an advantage, as P is convex and he could just play the corresponding convex combination directly; because (3) is linear in P, this results in the same expected loss. (Another way to view this is that, essentially, the quizmaster is randomizing, over a finite set of strategies.) For the contestant, Q is also convex, but in general (depending on L), playing a convex combination of strategies does not correspond to randomizing over those strategies. The two do correspond in the case of randomized 0-1 loss, where L is linear. If L is convex, then playing the convex combination is at least as good for him as randomizing (and if L is strictly convex, better), so allowing randomization would again not give an advantage. When (8) holds, any pair of worst-case optimal strategies (P * , Q * ) forms a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium, a concept introduced by Nash [20] : neither player can benefit from deviating from their worst-case optimal strategy if the other player leaves his strategy unchanged. This means that the definitions of worst-case optimality given above are also meaningful in the game we are actually interested in, where the players move simultaneously in the sense that neither knows the other's strategy when choosing his own.
Three standard loss functions
Three commonly used loss functions are logarithmic loss, Brier loss, and randomized 0-1 loss. These are defined as follows [14] :
Logarithmic loss is a strictly proper loss function, given by
Its entropy is the Shannon entropy H L (P) = x −P(x) log P(x). The functions L and H L are displayed in Figure 2a for the case of a binary prediction (i.e. a prediction between two possible outcomes). The (three-dimensional) graph of H L for the case of three outcomes will appear in Figure 3 on page 16. Brier loss is another strictly proper loss function, corresponding to squared Euclidean distance:
; L and H L are displayed in Figure 2b for a binary prediction. Note that for 3 outcomes and beyond, the Brier loss on outcome x is not simply a function of Q(x), it depends on the entire distribution Q.
The third loss function we will often refer to is randomized 0-1 loss, given by
It is improper: an optimal response Q to some distribution P puts all mass on outcome(s) with maximum P(x). Its entropy function is H L (P) = 1 − max x∈X P(x) (see Figure 2c ). It is related to hard 0-1 loss, which requires the contestant to pick a single outcome x and gives loss 0 if x = x and 1 otherwise. Randomized 0-1 loss essentially allows the contestant to randomize his prediction: L(x, Q) equals the expected value of hard 0-1 loss when x is distributed according to Q. An important difference between games with hard and randomized 0-1 loss will be shown later in Example F.
On duplicate messages and outcomes
Our definition of a game rules out duplicate messages in Y, which would not meaningfully change the options of either player as the two messages represent the same move for the quizmaster; this will be made precise in Lemma 2. The definition does allow duplicate outcomes: pairs of outcomes x 1 , x 2 ∈ X such that x 1 ∈ y if and only if x 2 ∈ y for all y ∈ Y. We will see later (in Example D) that games with such outcomes cannot generally be solved in terms of games without, and thus we must analyse them in their own right. 
Worst-case optimal strategies
In this section, we present characterization theorems that allow worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and contestant to be recognized for a large class of loss functions. In order to be applicable to a wide range of loss functions, this section is rather technical, and the characterizations of worst-case optimal strategies we find here are not always easy to use (though the abstract results in these sections are illustrated by concrete examples in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.3). We will find simpler characterizations for smaller classes of loss functions in Section 4. An overview of these results is given in Table 1 .
We will need the following properties of H L throughout our theory:
For all loss functions L, if H L is finite, then it is also concave and lower semi-continuous. If L is finite everywhere, then H L is finite, concave, and continuous.
(When we talk about (semi-)continuity, this is always with respect to the extended real line topology of losses, as in Rockafellar [17, Section 7] .)
Worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster
We start by studying the probability updating game from the perspective of the quizmaster. Using just the concavity of the quizmaster's objective (5) (which is a linear combination of concave generalized entropies), we can prove the following intuitive result.
Lemma 2 (Message subsumption). Suppose that for P ∈ P there are two messages y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y such that any outcome x ∈ y 2 with P(x, y 2 ) > 0 is also in y 1 . Then if H L is concave, the quizmaster can do at least as well without using y 2 . More precisely, P given by
P(x, y 1 ) + P(x, y 2 ) for y = y 1 ; 0 for y = y 2 ; P(x, y) otherwise.
is also in P and its expected generalized entropy is at least as large as that of P. In particular, if P is worst-case optimal, then so is P .
In particular, if y 1 ⊃ y 2 , any strategy P can be replaced by a strategy P with P (y 2 ) = 0 without making things worse for the quizmaster. Thus the quizmaster, who wants to maximize the contestant's expected loss, never needs to use a message that is contained in another.
A dominating hyperplane to a function f from D ⊆ R X to R is a hyperplane in R X × R that is nowhere below f . A supporting hyperplane to f (at P) is a dominating hyperplane that touches f at some point P.
2
A concave function has at least one supporting hyperplane at every point [17, Theorem 11.6 ], but it may be vertical. A nonvertical hyperplane can be described by a linear function : R X → R:
While H L is defined as a function on ∆ X , we will often need to talk about supporting hyperplanes to the function H L restricted to ∆ y for some message y ∈ Y. We use the notation H L ∆ y for the restriction of H L to the domain ∆ y . (Recall that we defined ∆ y as a subset of ∆ X .) A supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y is not a supporting hyperplane to
A supergradient is a generalization of the gradient: a supergradient of a concave function at a point is the gradient of a supporting hyperplane. If H L ∆ y is finite and continuous (and thus concave by Lemma 1), then for any vector λ ∈ R X , a unique supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y can be found having that vector as its gradient, by choosing α appropriately in (P) = α + x P(x)λ x [17, Theorem 27.3]. It will often be convenient in our discussion to talk about supporting hyperplanes rather than supergradients because they fix this choice of α.
Theorem 3 (Existence and characterization of P *
). For H L finite and upper semicontinuous (thus continuous), a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster (that is, a P ∈ P maximizing (5)) exists, and P * is such a strategy if and only if there exists a
for all y ∈ Y and P ∈ ∆ y , with equality if P * (y) > 0 and P = P * (· | y). That is, for y with P * (y) > 0, the linear function x∈y P(x)λ * x defines a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P * (· | y), and a dominating hyperplane for other y.
A vector λ * ∈ R X that satisfies the above for some worst-case optimal P * satisfies it for all worst-case optimal P * and is called a Kuhn-Tucker vector (or KT-vector).
Section 3.1.1 includes several examples illustrating the application of Theorem 3; a graphical illustration of the theorem is also included there ( Figure 3 ). We will see in Section 3.2 that KT-vectors form the bridge between worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and for the contestant.
Application to standard loss functions
The generalized entropy for logarithmic loss has only vertical supporting hyperplanes at the boundary of ∆ y for any y ∈ Y. These hyperplanes do not correspond to any KT-vector λ * ∈ R X , from which it follows that for any y with P * (y) > 0, the worst-case optimal strategy will not have P * (· | y) at the boundary of ∆ y . The same is not generally true: we will see below how for randomized 0-1 loss (in Example B on page 15, and Example D) and Brier loss (in Example E), games may have a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster that has P * (y) > 0, yet P * (x | y) = 0 for some y ∈ Y, x ∈ y.
Of the three loss functions we saw earlier, Brier loss and 0-1 loss are finite, so by Lemma 1, all conditions of Theorem 3 are satisfied for them. Logarithmic loss is infinite when the obtained outcome was predicted to have probability zero. The generalized entropy is still finite, because for any true distribution P, there exist predictions Q that give finite expected loss (in particular, Q = P does this). The entropy is also continuous: −P(x) log P(x) is continuous as a function of P(x) with our convention that 0 · ∞ = 0, and H L is the sum of such continuous functions. Thus we can apply Theorem 3 to analyse the Monty Hall problem for each of these three loss functions.
Example B (continued). For Monty Hall, the strategy P * of choosing a message uniformly when the true outcome is x 2 is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster, for all three loss functions. It is easy to verify that the theorem is satisfied by this strategy combined with the appropriate KT-vector: for logarithmic loss:
for Brier loss:
for randomized 0-1 loss: λ * = (0, 1, 0).
The situation for logarithmic loss is illustrated in Figure 3 . We also find that for logarithmic loss and Brier loss, P * is the unique worst-case optimal strategy, as the hyperplanes specified by λ * touch the generalized entropy functions at only one point each. For randomized 0-1 loss, on the other hand, all quizmaster strategies are worst-case optimal, as the hyperplane specified by λ
The worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster in the Monty Hall game with logarithmic loss, as characterized by Theorem 3. The triangular base is the full simplex ∆ X , on which the entropy function H L is defined (this is the grey dome); the points labelled x 1 , x 2 and x 3 are the elements of this simplex putting all mass on that single outcome; and the line segments ∆ y 1 and ∆ y 2 are the subsets of ∆ X consisting of all distributions supported on y 1 and y 2 respectively. Restricted to the domain ∆ y 1 , the vector λ * defines a linear function (having height λ * x at each x ∈ X) that is a supporting hyperplane to H L at P * (· | y 1 ) (and similar for y 2 ). Note that when the linear function defined by λ * is extended to all of ∆ X , it may go below H L there, but not in ∆ y 1 or ∆ y 2 .
Example C (The quizmaster discards a message). Consider a different game, with X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 }, Y = {{x 1 , x 2 }, {x 2 , x 3 }, {x 3 , x 4 }}, p given by p x 4 = 2/5 and p x = 1/5 elsewhere, and L logarithmic loss. In the terminology of the Monty Hall puzzle, there is no initial choice by the contestant that determines what moves are available to the quizmaster, but the quizmaster will again leave two doors closed: the one hiding the car, and another adjacent to it. Then one strategy for the quizmaster is to never give message y 2 to the contestant; i.e. to pick the strategy P ∈ P with P(y 2 ) = 0 shown to the right. The depicted strategy P is worst-case optimal: When applying the theorem, we see that the KT-vector λ * = (log 2, log 2, log 3, − log(2/3)) gives supporting hyperplanes to H L ∆ y 1 and H L ∆ y 3 , but a non-supporting dominating hyperplane to H L ∆ y 2 . This strategy can be seen to be intuitively reasonable because when the contestant receives message y 3 = {x 3 , x 4 }, he knows that the probability of the true outcome being x 4 is at least twice as large as the probability of it being x 3 . By always giving message y 3 when the true outcome is x 3 , the quizmaster can keep this difference from becoming larger.
P is also the unique worst-case optimal strategy for Brier loss (as shown by the same analysis) and for randomized 0-1 loss (where the KT-vector is not unique: (a, 1−a, 1, 0) for any a ∈ [0, 1] is a KT-vector).
In the previous examples, the worst-case optimal strategies P coincided for logarithmic and Brier loss. The following example shows that this is not always the case.
Example D (Dependence on loss function). Consider the family of games with X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 }, Y = {{x 1 , x 2 }, {x 2 , x 3 , x 4 }}, p x 1 = p x 2 = 1/3, and p x 3 = p x 4 = 1/6: This game is also similar to Monty Hall, but now one door has been 'split in two': the quizmaster will either open door 1, or doors 3 and 4. The strategy P shown to the right is worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss, but not for Brier loss: for both loss functions, there is a unique supporting hyperplane for both y that touches H L ∆ y at P(· | y) for P as shown in the table, but for Brier loss, these two hyperplanes do not have the same height at the common outcome x 2 . (Using Theorem 9 from page 22, we can find the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster under Brier loss by solving a quadratic equation with one unknown; this strategy has P(x 2 , y 1 ) = 11/3 − 2 √ 3 ≈ 0.20 and P(x 2 , y 2 ) = 2 √ 3 − 10/3 ≈ 0.13.)
For randomized 0-1 loss, neither the worst-case optimal strategy nor the KT-vector are unique: the KT-vectors are (0, 1, a, 1 − a) for any a ∈ [0, 1]; the worst-case optimal strategies are the P given above, the strategy that always gives message y 1 when the true outcome is x 2 , and all convex combinations of these. Example E (The quizmaster discards a message-outcome pair). Again consider the game from the previous example, but now with a different marginal as shown to the right. The strategy P is worstcase optimal for Brier loss, with KT-vector λ * = (0.02, 1.62, 0.5, 0.5).
P displays another curious property (that we also saw for randomized 0-1 loss in the previous example): while the quizmaster uses message y 2 for some outcomes, he does not use it in combination with outcome x 2 . In the theorem, the hyperplane on ∆ y 2 is supporting at P(· | y 2 ), but is not a tangent plane: compared to the tangent plane, it has been 'lifted up' at the opposite vertex of the simplex ∆ y 2 (x 2 ) to the same height as the supporting hyperplane on ∆ y 1 . This behaviour cannot occur in games with logarithmic loss: as we observed at the beginning of Section 3.1.1, if a worst-case optimal strategy P * has P * (y) > 0 for some y ∈ Y, then it must assign positive probability to P * (x | y) for all x ∈ y.
Worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant
We now turn our attention to worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant. To this end, we look at the relation between the KT-vectors that appeared in Theorem 3 and the set of strategies Q the contestant can choose from.
Realizable hyperplanes
For any y ∈ Y, ∆ y is defined in Section 2 as a (|y| − 1)-dimensional subset of R X ≥0 . Thus a linear function : ∆ y → R can be extended to a linear function¯ on the domain R X ≥0 in different ways. Hence many different vectors λ ∈ R X representing supporting hyperplanes will correspond to what we can view as a single supergradient, because the hyperplanes agree on ∆ y . We can make the extension unique by requiring¯ to be zero at the origin and at the vertices of the simplex ∆ X\y . Because such a normalized function¯ : R X ≥0 → R obeys¯ (0) = 0, it can be written as¯ (P) = P λ for some λ. These functions are thus uniquely identified by their gradients λ, allowing us to refer to them using 'the (supporting) hyperplane λ'. Let Λ y be the set of all gradients of such normalized functions that represent dominating hyperplanes to H L ∆ y ; in formula, let
For each nonvertical supporting hyperplane of H L ∆ y , clearly the gradient is in Λ y ; that is, all finite supergradients of this restricted function have a normalized representative in Λ y . The set also includes vectors λ for which P λ > H L (P) for all P ∈ ∆ y , which do not correspond to supporting hyperplanes. Not all vectors λ ∈ Λ y may be available to the contestant as responses to a play of y ∈ Y by the quizmaster. As a trivial example, consider logarithmic loss and a vector λ with x∈y e −λ x < 1 and λ x = 0 for x y. Then λ ∈ Λ y because the hyperplane defined by λ is dominating to H L ∆ y (thus the expected loss from λ is larger than what the contestant could achieve), but clearly there is no distribution Q ∈ ∆ X that results in these losses on x ∈ y. We say that a vector λ ∈ Λ y is realizable on y if there exists a Q ∈ ∆ X such that L(x, Q) = λ x for all x ∈ y, and then we say that such a Q realizes λ.
A partial order on vectors λ, λ ∈ R X is given by: λ ≤ λ if and only if λ x ≤ λ x for all x ∈ X. We write λ < λ when λ ≤ λ and λ λ . For all y ∈ Y, this partial order has the following property: For λ, λ ∈ Λ y , we have λ ≤ λ if and only if for all P ∈ ∆ y , P λ ≤ P λ (since any linear function is maximized over the simplex at a vertex). Therefore if Q, Q ∈ ∆ X realize λ, λ ∈ Λ y respectively and λ ≤ λ , the contestant is never hurt by using Q instead of Q as a prediction given the message y.
Any minimal element with respect to this partial order defines a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y . For P in the relative interior of ∆ y , the converse also holds: all supporting hyperplanes at P are minimal elements. This is not the case for P at the relative boundary of ∆ y , where some supporting hyperplanes (the ones that 'tip over' the boundary) are not minimal.
Lemma 4.
If H L is finite and continuous on ∆ y , then the following hold:
1. If λ ∈ Λ y is not a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y , then there exists a supporting hyperplane λ ∈ Λ y with λ < λ; 2. If λ ∈ Λ y is a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P but is not minimal in Λ y , then there exists a minimal λ < λ in Λ y ; 3. If λ ∈ Λ y is a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P, then any λ ≤ λ in Λ y is a supporting hyperplane at P and obeys λ x = λ x for all x ∈ y with P(x) > 0.
Thus the contestant never needs to play a Q |y realizing a non-minimal element of Λ y .
Existence
With the help of Lemma 4, we can formulate sufficient conditions for the existence of a worst-case optimal strategy Q * for the contestant that, together with P * for the quizmaster, forms a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5 (Existence of Q *
). Suppose that H L is finite and continuous and that for all y ∈ Y, all minimal supporting hyperplanes λ ∈ Λ y to H L ∆ y are realizable on y. Then there exists a worst-case optimal strategy Q * ∈ Q for the contestant that achieves the same expected loss in the minimax game as P * achieves in the maximin game: (P * , Q * ) is a Nash equilibrium.
We will see in Theorem 9 that a (or rather, at least one) Nash equilibrium exists for logarithmic loss and Brier loss. The existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with randomized 0-1 loss is shown by the following consequence of Theorem 5.
Proposition 6. In games with randomized 0-1 loss, a Nash equilibrium exists.
The following example shows what may go wrong if some supporting hyperplanes are not realizable.
Example F (Hard 0-1 loss). Consider the game with X, Y and p as shown in the table, and with hard 0-1 loss (so that the contestant is not allowed to randomize):
This loss function has the same entropy function as randomized 0-1 loss, so the two loss functions are the same from the quizmaster's perspective. The table shows the unique worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster, with KT-vector λ * = ( 1 /2, 1 /2, 1 /2) and expected loss 1/2. For randomized 0-1 loss, the (as we will see below: unique) worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant would be to respond to any message y with the uniform distribution on y. However, for all y ∈ Y, λ given by
is not realizable on y under hard 0-1 loss, so Theorem 5 does not apply. In fact, for any strategy Q the contestant might use, there exists a strategy P for the quizmaster that gives expected loss 2/3 or larger (because for at least two outcomes x, there must be a y x such that L(x, Q |y ) = 1). Thus the inequality (7) is strict: there is no Nash equilibrium, and a worst-case optimal strategy for either player is optimal only in the minimax/maximin sense. This example also shows that the condition on existence of supporting hyperplanes in Theorem 5 cannot be replaced by the weaker condition that the infimum appearing in the definition (4) of H L is always attained.
Games without Nash equilibria. We will now briefly go into the situation seen in the preceding example, where Theorem 5 does not apply.
While for some games with L hard 0-1 loss, no Nash equilibrium may exist, worstcase optimal strategies for the contestant do exist, and can be characterized using stable sets of a graph. A stable set is a set of nodes no two of which are adjacent [21, Chapter 64] . Consider the graph with node set X and with an edge between two nodes if and only if they occur together in some message. A set S ⊆ X is stable in this graph if and only if there exists a strategy Q ∈ Q for the contestant such that for all x ∈ S , max y∈Y:x∈y L(x, Q |y ) = 0, and equal to 1 otherwise. The worst-case loss obtained by this strategy is 1− x∈S p x . Thus finding the worst-case optimal strategy Q for the contestant is equivalent to finding a stable set S with maximum weight. Algorithmically, this is an NP-hard problem in general, though polynomial-time algorithms exist for certain classes of graphs, including perfect (this includes bipartite) graphs and claw-free graphs [21] .
With the exception of two examples in Section 4.1 illustrating the limits of our theory, we will not look at games without Nash equilibria any more from now on.
Characterization and nonuniqueness
The concept of a KT-vector, which helped characterize worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster in Theorem 3, now returns for a similar role in the characterization of worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant. If the loss L(x, Q * |y ) equals λ x for all x ∈ y, then the worst-case optimal strategy Q * is an equalizer strategy [19] : the expected loss of Q * does not depend on the quizmaster's strategy. Not all games have an equalizer strategy as worst-case optimal strategy, as Example H below shows.
The following examples demonstrate that a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant is in general not unique.
Example G (λ * not unique). Consider the game with X, Y and p as in the table to the right, and with randomized 0-1 loss. For the quizmaster, any P * that is uniform given each y is worst-case optimal, and any λ a = (a, 1 − a, a, 1 − a) with a ∈ [0, 1] is a KT-vector. To each λ a corresponds a unique worst-case optimal Q * , namely the strategy that puts conditional probability 1 − a on outcome x 1 or x 3 (whichever is in the given message), and probability a on x 2 or x 4 .
Note that if we replace randomized 0-1 loss by a strictly proper loss function such as logarithmic or Brier loss, the KT-vector and the worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant become unique, while the same set of strategies as before continues to be worst-case optimal for the quizmaster. This shows that the freedom for the contestant we see here for randomized 0-1 loss is due to the nonuniqueness of the KT-vector, not due to the nonuniqueness of P * . should be in a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant.
We see that P * assigns probability zero to message y 3 , and the KT-vector
specifies a hyperplane that does not support H L in ∆ y 3 . Hence the construction of Q * |y 3 in the proof of Theorem 5 allows freedom in the choice of a minimal element λ ∈ Λ y 3 less than (− log 2/5, 0, − log 2/5): the valid choices are (− log q, 0, − log(1 − q)) for any q ∈ [2/5, 3/5]; each of these is realized on y 3 by Q |y 3 = (q, 0, 1 − q). Using Theorem 7, we can verify that these choices of Q * |y 3 define worst-case optimal strategies: the vector λ defined there equals the KT-vector λ * given above.
This also shows that worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant cannot be characterized simply as 'optimal responses to P * ': in this example, P * (· | y 3 ) is undefined, yet there is a nontrivial constraint on Q |y 3 in the worst-case optimal strategy Q for the contestant.
Results for well-behaved loss functions
In the preceding sections, we have established characterization results for the worstcase optimal strategies of both players. While these results are applicable to many loss functions, they have the disadvantage of being complicated, involving supporting hyperplanes. For some common loss functions, simpler characterizations can be given.
Proper continuous loss functions
Recall from page 8 that for a proper loss function, the contestant's expected loss for a given message is minimized if his predicted probabilities equal the true probabilities. Such loss functions are natural to consider in our probability updating game, as our goal will often be to find these true probabilities. However, simplifying our theorems requires further restrictions on the class of loss functions. In this subsection, we consider loss functions that are both proper and continuous.
Lemma 8.
If the loss function L(x, Q) is proper and continuous as a function of Q for all x and H L is finite, then H L is differentiable in the following sense: for all y ∈ Y and all P ∈ ∆ y , there is at most one element of Λ y that is a minimal supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P; if P is in the relative interior of ∆ y , there is exactly one. If it exists, the minimal supporting hyperplane at P is realized by Q |y = P.
The uniqueness of minimal supporting hyperplanes in Λ y is equivalent to there being exactly one equivalence class of supergradients, where supergradients are taken to be equivalent if their corresponding supporting hyperplanes coincide on ∆ y . The property shown in the above lemma is then related to differentiability by Rockafellar [17, Theorem 25 .1], which says that for a finite, concave function such as H L , uniqueness of the supergradient at P is equivalent to differentiability at P. Theorem 9. For L proper and continuous and H L finite and continuous, 1. worst-case optimal strategies for both players exist and form a Nash equilibrium; 2. there is a unique KT-vector; 3. a strategy P * ∈ P for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal if and only if there
for all x ∈ y with P * (x, y) > 0,
for all x ∈ y with P * (x, y) = 0, P * (y) > 0, and
for all x ∈ y with P * (y) = 0;
4. a strategy Q * for the contestant is worst-case optimal if and only if there exists a worst-case optimal P * such that for all x,
which holds if and only if (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P * .
Using this theorem, many observations made about logarithmic loss and Brier loss in the examples we have seen so far can now be more easily verified. For instance, in the worst-case optimal strategy we saw in Example E on page 18, we verify that
While uniqueness of λ * was established by the theorem, we do not have uniqueness of P * or Q * . Multiple worst-case optimal strategies Q * for the contestant may exist as soon as a message is unused, as in Example H. Multiple worst-case optimal strategies P * for the quizmaster are also possible, even for strictly proper L: see Example G. The worst-case optimality criterion does not provide any guidance for selecting particular strategies in such cases. One might make use of symmetry and/or various kinds of limits to select a specific recommendation, or search for an analogue of subgame perfect equilibria. We will leave such interesting extensions to future research.
Local loss functions
Logarithmic loss is an example of a local loss function: a loss function where the loss L(x, Q) depends on the probability assigned by the prediction Q to the obtained outcome x, but not on the probabilities assigned to outcomes that did not occur. The following theorem shows how for such loss functions, worst-case optimality of the quizmaster's strategy can be characterized purely in terms of probabilities, without converting them to losses. 
If additionally H L ∆ y is strictly concave for all y ∈ Y, only such P * are worst-case optimal for L.
Among loss functions that are 'smooth' for all x, logarithmic loss is, up to some transformations, the only proper local loss function [22] . We do not know what nonsmooth local proper loss functions may exist. In particular, it is conceivable (yet unlikely) that a discontinuous L exists satisfying the conditions of Theorem 10, but not those of Theorem 9.
If L is also continuous, then Theorem 9 applies, and it follows that Q * ∈ Q is a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant if Q * |y (x) ≥ q x for all y ∈ Y, x ∈ y. For strictly proper loss functions such as logarithmic loss, this fully characterizes the worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant. P *
The equality of conditionals P * (x | y) with the same x in the statement of Theorem 10 is oddly similar to the CAR condition we saw in Section 1, but reversing the roles of outcomes and messages. We may say that a strategy P * satisfying (10) is RCAR (sometimes with vector q), for 'reverse CAR'. Note that whether a strategy is RCAR does not depend on the loss function.
A vector q is called an RCAR vector if a strategy P * ∈ P exists such that P * and q satisfy (10) . This definition is also independent of the loss function. If q is an RCAR vector, then q x > 0 for all x ∈ X; otherwise we would get P * (x) = 0 < p x . Like the KT-vector λ * in Theorem 9, the RCAR vector is unique:
If each message in Y contains an outcome x not contained in any other message, then any strategy P * must have P * (y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y. Then the first line of (10) implies that x∈y q x = 1 for all y. Thus the second line is now satisfied automatically, allowing the theorem to be simplified for this case:
Corollary 12. A strategy P * ∈ P with P * (y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y that satisfies
is worst-case optimal for the loss functions covered by Theorem 10
In this case, P * is an equalizer strategy [19] . The symmetry between versions of CAR and RCAR is clearest in Corollary 12: the condition (11) is the mirror image of the definition of strong CAR in Jaeger [8] . Thus we may call it strong RCAR. Ordinary RCAR (10) imposes an inequality on q for messages with probability 0, which has no analogue in the CAR literature that we know of: the definition of weak CAR in [8] puts no requirement at all on outcomes with probability 0.
Strict concavity of H L occurred as a new condition in Theorem 10. The main loss function of interest here is logarithmic loss, and its entropy is strictly concave. For other loss functions, the following lemma relates strict concavity of H L to conditions we have seen before.
Lemma 13. If L is strictly proper and all minimal supporting hyperplanes λ ∈ Λ y to H L ∆ y are realizable on y for all y ∈ Y, then H L is strictly concave on H L ∆ y for all y ∈ Y.
Affine transformations of the loss function. Previously, we mentioned that logarithmic loss is the only local proper loss function up to some transformations. The transformations considered in Bernardo [22] are affine transformations, of the form
for a ∈ R >0 and b ∈ R X . (This transformation can result in a function L that can take negative values, so that it does not satisfy our definition of a loss function. However, our results can easily be extended to loss functions bounded from below by an arbitrary real number, so we allow such transformations here.)
The following lemma shows that, for logarithmic loss as well as for other loss functions, the transformation (12) does not change how the players of the probability updating game should act. Lemma 14. Let L be a loss function for which H L is finite and continuous, and let L be an affine transformation of L as in (12) . Then a strategy P * is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in the game G := (X, Y, p, L ) if and only if P * is worst-case optimal in G := (X, Y, p, L). If G also satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5, then the same equivalence holds for worst-case optimal strategies Q * for the contestant. Lemma 14 has highly important implications when applied to the logarithmic loss. While multiplying logarithmic loss by a constant a 1 merely corresponds to changing the base of the logarithm, adding constants b x allows the logarithmic loss to become the appropriate loss function for a very wide class of games. This means that the RCAR characterization of worst-case optimal strategies for logarithmic loss is also valid for all these games. We are referring to so-called Kelly gambling games, also known as horse race games [23] in the literature. In such games (with terminology adapted to our setting), for any outcome x the contestant can buy a ticket which costs e 1 and which pays off a positive amount e c x if x actually obtains; if some x x is realized, nothing is paid so the e 1 is lost. The contestant is allowed to distribute his capital over several tickets (outcomes), and he is also allowed to buy a fractional nonnegative number of tickets. For example, if X = {1, 2} and c 1 = c 2 = 2, then the contestant is guaranteed to neither win nor lose any money if he splits his capital fifty-fifty over both outcomes. Now consider a contestant with some initial capital (say, e 1), who faces an i.i.d. sequence (X 1 , Y 1 ), (X 2 , Y 2 ), . . . ∼ P of outcomes in X × Y. At each point in time i he observes 'side information' Y i = y i and he distributes his capital gained so far over all x ∈ X, putting some fraction Q |y i (x) of his capital on outcome x. Then he is paid out according to the x i that was actually realized. Here each Q |y is a probability distribution over X, i.e. for all y ∈ Y, all x ∈ X, Q |y (x) ≥ 0 and x∈X Q |y (x) = 1. So if his capital was U i before the i-th round, it will be U i · Q |y i (x i )c x i after the i-th round. By the law of large numbers, his capital will grow (or shrink, depending on the odds on offer) almost surely exponentially fast, with exponent E X,Y∼P [log Q |Y (X)c X ] = E X,Y∼P [log Q |Y (X) − b X ], where b x = − log c x [23, Chapter 6]. Thus, the contestant's capital will grow fastest, among all constant strategies and against an adversarial distribution P ∈ P, if he plays a worst-case optimal strategy for gains log Q(x) − b x , i.e. for loss function L (x, Q) = − log Q(x) + b x . By Lemma 14 above, this worst-case optimal strategy Q * is just the Q * that is also worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss -it does not depend on the pay-offs ('odds' in the horse race interpretation) c x . Clearly, if data are i.i.d. then this continues to hold even if the pay-offs are allowed to change over time, and even if the contestant is allowed to use different strategies at different time points: the worst-case optimal capital growth rate is always achieved by choosing Q * at all time points.
The upshot is that whenever (a) the probability updating game is played repeatedly, and (b) the contestant is allowed to reinvest and redistribute his capital over all outcomes at each point in time, then his worst-case optimal strategy is equal to the worstcase optimal Q * for logarithmic loss irrespective of the pay-offs. This makes the logarithmic loss, and hence the RCAR characterization, appropriate for a very wide class of settings.
The RCAR characterization for general loss functions
Our results so far have focused on properties of the loss function L. This section will focus on understanding a game's message structure Y. For the purpose of summarizing our main theorems in simplified form, we restrict attention to irreducible games. Those are games which are connected (a game is disconnected if the outcome space can be partitioned such that each message is contained within one of the parts) and contain no dominated messages (a message is dominated if it is a strict subset of another message). We say that a game is a graph game (Section 5.3) if all its messages are binary, and we call it a matroid game (Section 5.4) if its messages satisfy the basis exchange property [24, Corollary 1.2.5] detailed below. The abstract matroid property holds for a rich class of games, including e.g. negation games, where each message excludes a single outcome. Monty Hall (Example B) is both a graph and a matroid game. We also need a mild condition on loss functions. We call a loss function regular if it is invariant under permutations of the outcomes, and has finite and continuous associated entropy function H L .
To solve a quizmaster-contestant game, we are typically looking for a Nash equilibrium (saddle point strategy pair). In general, not only the contestant's optimal response but also the optimal quizmaster strategy will depend on the loss function. This dependence renders probability updating an application-dependent endeavour. Our main result in this section is that for an important class of games (and only these) the optimal quizmaster strategy is independent of the loss function. For these cases we derive a probability update rule that is application independent, like standard probability conditioning, but that applies much more broadly. The following is the summary result of this section (the precise statements can be found in Theorems 18, 19 and 20).
Theorem 15. Fix an irreducible game with set of messages Y. Then
Y is a graph or a matroid iff for any marginal on outcomes, the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster is identical for all regular loss functions
We first show a simple method of simplifying message structures in Section 5.1; there we will also see that if Y is a partition of X, naive conditioning is worst-case optimal.
In Section 5.2, we consider symmetry properties that worst-case optimal strategies must have, provided that the loss function also obeys a form of symmetry. Then in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we show two classes of message structures for which the worstcase optimal strategy for the quizmaster can be characterized by the RCAR condition (10) . This is the condition that also characterizes worst-case optimal strategies for local loss functions and for Kelly gambling with arbitrary payoffs (by Theorem 10 and Lemma 14); the results in this section show that the same characterization sometimes holds for a much more general class of loss functions. This leads to an interesting property of those (and only those) message structures, discussed in Section 5.5: the same strategy P * will be optimal for the quizmaster regardless of the loss function. We will look at the game from the perspective of the quizmaster, and consider worst-case optimal strategies P * for him. In games for which a Nash equilibrium exists, the contestant's worst-case optimal strategies can be found easily once we know P * and a KT-vector certifying its optimality as in Theorem 3: given a KT-vector, Q * can be constructed message-by-message to satisfy the condition in Theorem 7. This is even easier in the case of proper loss functions, where for each y with P * (y) > 0, an optimal response is simply Q * |y = P * (· | y). Another advantage of looking at the game from the quizmaster's side is that our Theorem 3 characterizing worst-case optimal P * requires weaker conditions than Theorem 7 characterizing worst-case optimal Q * .
Decomposition of games
For some message structures, regardless of the marginal and loss function, the problem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster can be solved by considering a smaller message structure instead. It will be useful to look at such simplifications first, so that in the coming sections we will only need to deal with message structures that have already been simplified.
We have already seen one example of the type of result we are looking for earlier, in Lemma 2 on page 13, where we saw that if a message is dominated by another (meaning that it is a subset of the other), then the quizmaster always has a worst-case optimal strategy that assigns probability 0 to the dominated message. In this subsection, we introduce a second simplification, by means of decomposition into connected components.
Connectivity is a fundamental concept from graph theory. However, in general, our message structures are not graphs, but hypergraphs. Like an ordinary graph, a hypergraph is defined by a set of nodes and a set of edges, but the edges are allowed to be arbitrary subsets of the nodes; in a graph, all edges must contain exactly two nodes. Thus for a probability updating game, we can talk about the hypergraph (X, Y), having the outcomes as its nodes and the messages as its edges.
The terminology of connectivity can be generalized from graphs to hypergraphs [15] . We will say that a game is connected if its underlying hypergraph is connected. This leads to the following definitions.
If for some game G = (X, Y, p, L), there is a set ∅ S X such that for each message y, either y ⊆ S or y ⊆ X \ S , then the game can be decomposed into two games
. If no such set S exists, we say the game G is connected.
Lemma 16 (Decomposition).
If a game G can be decomposed into G 1 and G 2 as described above, and its loss function L is such that H L is finite and continuous and H L (P) = inf Q∈∆ y x∈y P(x)L(x, Q) for each y ∈ Y and each P ∈ ∆ y , then a strategy P * is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in G if and only if there exist worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster P * 1 and P * 2 in G 1 and G 2 respectively such that
(The extra condition on L is necessary to exclude some 'very improper' loss functions: those that reward the contestant for predicting outcomes known to have probability 0.) In particular, if the messages of G form a partition of X, then G can be decomposed into games that each contain only one message. In a game G of this form, the quizmaster has only one strategy to choose from. If the loss function is proper, naive conditioning is an optimal response to this strategy, and thus worst-case optimal.
Together with Lemma 2, this lemma allows us to reduce any game in which we want to find a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster to a set of connected games containing no dominated messages. These reduced games will not contain any messages of size one, unless one of the games consists of only that message: a message of size one is either dominated, or it forms a trivial component containing no other messages.
Outcome symmetry
Sometimes, the problem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy is simplified because certain 'symmetry' properties of the message structure and loss function allow us to conclude that worst-case optimal strategies satisfying an additional condition must have the same symmetries.
Symmetry of loss functions
We now briefly return to the topic of loss functions to define a property we will need next. For a probability distribution Q ∈ ∆ X and x 1 , x 2 distinct elements of X, define Q x 1 ↔x 2 as
and similarly for a contestant's strategy Q ∈ Q by applying this transformation to the conditional for each y. We say L is symmetric between x 1 and x 2 if for all
If L is symmetric between x 1 and x 2 and between x 2 and x 3 , then it is also symmetric between x 1 and x 3 , because ((Q x 1 ↔x 2 ) x 2 ↔x 3 )
In words: we can apply the first symmetry, then the second, then the first again to find that we have exchanged x 1 and x 3 . We also consider any loss function to be symmetric between x and x for any x. So this symmetry of L is an equivalence relation on X, and we are justified in talking about L being symmetric on sets S ⊆ X, meaning that all pairs of elements of that set can be exchanged. If L is symmetric on X, we say it is fully symmetric.
The loss functions we have seen so far were fully symmetric. The affine transformations of loss functions discussed at the end of Section 4.2 may change the symmetries of a loss function, while they do not change which strategies are worst-case optimal for the two players. This means that sometimes, an asymmetric loss function can be transformed into an essentially equivalent loss function with better symmetry properties. Yet not all loss functions can be transformed this way. The following two examples are about loss functions exhibiting this kind of inherent asymmetry.
Example I (Matrix loss). Given a [0, ∞)-valued X × X matrix of losses A, define hard matrix loss by
This generalizes hard 0-1 loss, which is obtained for the matrix A with zeroes on the diagonal and ones elsewhere (except that the definition above may give infinite loss for some Q, but a rational contestant would never use such Q). It is symmetric between x 1 and x 2 if and only if swapping row x 1 with x 2 and column x 1 with x 2 results in matrix A again; that is, if and only if A x 1 ,
We can also define randomized matrix loss as an analogous generalization of randomized 0-1 loss, by taking an expectation over Q in hard matrix loss:
It has the same symmetry properties as hard matrix loss. The proof of Proposition 6 also applies to randomized matrix loss without modification, showing that a Nash equilibrium exists in games using this loss function.
Example J (Skewed logarithmic loss). Fix a vector c ∈ R X ≥0 , and define the function
This is a sum of differentiable concave functions, and therefore differentiable and concave; if c ∈ R X >0 , it is strictly concave (in fact, it is also strictly concave if c contains a single 0). We use the construction of Bregman scores in Grünwald and Dawid [14, Section 3.5.4] to construct a proper loss function L having F as its generalized entropy, and find
where e x is the distribution that puts all mass on x. This loss function is strictly proper if H L is strictly concave. Unlike logarithmic loss and its affine transformations, it is not local for |X| > 2. Also, it is not generally fully symmetric, but is symmetric between pairs of outcomes x 1 , x 2 ∈ X with c x 1 = c x 2 .
Symmetry of KT-vectors
Using the definition of symmetry of loss functions introduced in the previous section, we can now state the following lemma.
Lemma 17 (Loss exchange). Consider a game with y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y, y 1 \ y 2 = {x 1 }, y 2 \ y 1 = {x 2 }, H L finite and continuous and L symmetric between x 1 and x 2 . If a worst-case optimal strategy P * for the quizmaster exists with P * (x 1 , y 1 ) > 0, then all KT-vectors λ *
).
When two messages y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y satisfy y 1 \ y 2 = {x 1 } and y 2 \ y 1 = {x 2 }, we say that they differ by the exchange of one outcome.
It will be useful to have a term for the symmetry conditions on L that allow us to apply Lemma 17 to any pair of messages in some set Y ⊆ Y satisfying the statement of the lemma. We say L is symmetric with respect to exchanges in Y if L is symmetric between any pair of outcomes x 1 , x 2 such that messages y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y exist with y 1 \ y 2 = {x 1 } and y 2 \ y 1 = {x 2 }.
We saw in Theorem 10 that for logarithmic loss, worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster can be characterized in terms of a simple condition, the RCAR condition (10). We also saw that sometimes (in Examples B and C on pages 15 and 17, but not in Example D), those same strategies were also worst-case optimal for other loss functions. This suggests that even for some types of games where Theorem 10 does not apply, it is possible to recognize worst-case optimal strategies using the easily verifiable RCAR condition. We show that there are two classes of message structures in which this is possible regardless of the marginal, and explore the consequences in Section 5.5.
Graph games
The first of these classes consist of all message structures Y for which each message contains at most two outcomes. After removing singleton messages (which are either dominated or are decomposable from the rest of the game), we have |y| = 2 for all y ∈ Y. This corresponds to a simple undirected graph (that is, a graph containing no loops or multiple edges) with a node for each outcome in X and an edge for each message in Y. For this reason, a game where each message in Y contains at most two outcomes is called a graph game. Many games we saw in previous examples were graph games. Their underlying graphs are shown in Figure 4 .
Theorem 18 (RCAR for graph games).
If each message in Y contains at most two outcomes and P * ∈ P is an RCAR strategy, then P * is worst-case optimal for all L symmetric with respect to exchanges in {y ∈ Y | |y| = 2} with H L finite and continuous. If additionally H L is strictly concave, only such P * are worst-case optimal for L.
The statement of the theorem is very similar to that of Theorem 10 in Section 4.2, and the restrictions on L in the present theorem (except for symmetry) were also seen in the previous theorem. Sufficient conditions for these restrictions to hold were given by Lemma 1 in Section 3.1 (H L finite and continuous) and Lemma 13 in Section 4.2 (strict concavity of H L ). The intuition behind the proof is that for binary predictions Q, the probability assigned by Q to one outcome determines the probability Q assigns to the other outcome. Thus all loss functions are essentially local when used to assess such predictions, and their behaviour is similar to logarithmic loss.
Matroid games
The other class is that of matroid games. A matroid over a finite ground set X can be defined by a nonempty family Y of subsets of X (the bases of the matroid) satisfying the basis exchange property [24, Corollary 1.2.5]: for all y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y and x 1 ∈ y 1 \ y 2 , (y 1 \ {x 1 }) ∪ {x 2 } ∈ Y for some x 2 ∈ y 2 \ y 1 .
In words, for any pair of messages, if an outcome that is not in the second message is removed from the first message, it must be possible to replace it by an outcome from the second message that is not in the first message, in such a way that the resulting set of outcomes is again a message. A matroid game is a game in which Y is the set of bases of a matroid. The Monty Hall game (Example B) is a matroid game: taking one of the two messages and replacing the outcome unique to it by the only other outcome will result in the other message. By our definition of a game, it is required in addition to (13) that each element of the ground set X of the matroid occurs in some basis.
Many alternative characterizations of matroids exist. For example, a matroid with ground set X and bases Y can also be represented by its family of independent sets I = {I ⊆ X | I ⊆ y for some y ∈ Y}, and a different set of axioms analogous to (13) characterizes whether a given set I is the family of independent sets of some matroid.
The concept of a matroid was introduced by Whitney [25] to study the abstract properties of the notion of dependence, as seen for example in linear algebra and graph theory (explained below). Different characterizations of the concept, applied to different examples, were given independently by other authors, but then turned out to be equivalent to matroids. One field where matroids play an important role is combinatorial optimization. We refer to Schrijver [21, Section 39.10b] for extensive historical notes.
We give two example classes of matroids, taken from Schrijver [21, Section 39.4]:
• Given an m × n matrix A over some vector space, let X = {1, 2, . . . , n} and I the family of all subsets I of X such that the set of column vectors with index in I is linearly independent. Then I is the family of independent sets of a matroid. A subset that spans the column space of A is a basis of this matroid.
• Given a simple undirected graph G, let X be its set of edges and I consist of all acyclic subsets of X. Then I is the family of independent sets of a matroid. This matroid is called the cycle matroid of G. The bases are the maximal independent sets; if G is connected, these are its spanning trees.
One interesting class of games for which Y are the bases of a matroid is the class of negation games. In such a game, each element of Y is of the form X \ {x} for some x.
(Not all sets of this form need to be in Y.) Thus the quizmaster will tell the contestant, "The true outcome is not x," as in the original Monty Hall problem where one of the three doors is opened to reveal a goat. A family Y of this form satisfies (13) trivially: for y 1 , y 2 distinct elements of Y, there is only one choice for each of x 1 and x 2 , and with these choices we get (
Another class of matroids is formed by the uniform matroids, in which every set of some fixed size k is a basis. These also have a natural interpretation when they occur as the message structure of a game: the quizmaster is allowed to leave any set of k doors shut.
As the following theorem shows, matroid games share with graph games the property that RCAR strategies are worst-case optimal for a wide variety of loss functions.
Theorem 19 (RCAR for matroid games).
If Y are the bases of a matroid and P * ∈ P is an RCAR strategy, then P * is worst-case optimal for all L symmetric with respect to exchanges in Y with H L finite and continuous. If additionally H L is strictly concave, only such P * are worst-case optimal for L.
Loss invariance
We saw in the preceding sections that in graph and matroid games, worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized by the RCAR property. This property does not depend on what loss function is used in the game (though the theorems do put some conditions on the loss function, such as some symmetry requirements). Consequently, in such games, strategies exist that are worst-case optimal regardless of what loss function is used (at least, for a large class of loss functions). We call this phenomenon loss invariance.
For such message structures, we can really think of the worst-case optimal strategies as 'conditioning' (as a purely probability-based operation) rather than as worstcase optimal strategies for some game. This conditioning operation can be seen as the generalization of naive conditioning to message structures other than partitions (where naive conditioning gives the right answer). Unlike naive conditioning, which requires just the distribution p and the message y to compute P(x | y), we also need the message structure Y to compute that conditional probability. But like naive conditioning, we do not need to fix a loss function in order to talk about the worst-case optimal prediction of x given a message y.
A subtlety appears when improper loss functions are considered. Our theorems show that the worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized independently of the loss function; however, the worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant will not necessarily coincide with these if the loss function is not proper. In this case, loss invariance tells us that the loss function does not affect what the contestant should believe about the true outcome, but it may affect how the contestant translates this belief into a prediction.
In the cases of graph and matroid games, our analysis of worst-case optimal strategies becomes more widely applicable in situations where the probability updating game is really played by two players (as opposed to being a theoretical tool for defining safe updating strategies):
• the same strategies continue to be worst-case optimal if the two players use different loss functions (so that the game is no longer zero-sum);
• both players will be able to play optimally without knowing the loss function(s) in use.
This is true for the Monty Hall game (Example B), which lies in the intersection of graph and matroid games. This provides some justification for the prevailing intuition that the Monty Hall problem should be analysed using probability theory, without mention of loss functions. Theorems 18 and 19 apply only to loss functions that are sufficiently symmetric and for which H L is continuous and finite. We make no claim about the question whether RCAR strategies are also worst-case optimal for loss functions that do not satisfy these properties. However, note that by Lemma 14, sometimes affine transformations can be used to convert an asymmetric loss function into a symmetric one without affecting the players' strategies. Lemma 14 also shows that a limited form of loss invariance holds regardless of the message structure. If the players are using different affine transformations of the same loss function (for example, of logarithmic loss; this corresponds to Kelly gambling where the pay-offs for the contestant are different from those for the quizmaster), both players can play optimally without knowing the transformations in use.
An obvious question that remains is: are there any other classes of message structure for which we have loss invariance? This is answered in the negative by the following theorem.
Theorem 20. If a connected game containing no dominated messages is neither a matroid game nor a graph game, then there exists a marginal such that no strategy P for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal for both logarithmic loss and Brier loss.
Conclusion
Conditioning is the method of choice for updating probabilities to incorporate new information. We started by reviewing why naive conditioning gives incorrect answers when the set of messages is not a partition of the set of outcomes. For in this case the association of messages to outcomes (the coarsening mechanism, or quizmaster strategy) needs to be taken into account. In general however, this mechanism is unknown. Previous work showed that conditioning is correct if the mechanism satisfies (variants of) the CAR (coarsening at random) condition. In this article we take a different route and investigate minimax probability updating strategies that are robust to the worst-case coarsening mechanism. To this end we modelled probability updating as a two-player zero sum game between a quizmaster and a contestant. In Section 3 we discussed the optimal strategies for both players, characterizing both the hardest coarsening mechanism (quizmaster strategy) and the worst-case optimal way to incorporate new information (contestant strategy). In Section 4 we specialized the results to different classes of loss functions. A summary of these theorems was given in Table 1 on page 13. Then in Section 5 we investigated graph and matroid games, and show that for these games the worst-case optimal strategy does not depend on which loss function is used by both players, so that the updated probabilities are independent of the intended application.
Future work
There are many scenarios in which our results currently do not apply, but to which they might be extended. For example, the quizmaster's hard constraint y x could be replaced by some soft constraint, so that each message y still carries information about the true outcome, but no longer in the form of a subset of X. One way to achieve this might be by affine transformations of the loss function as discussed at the end of Section 4.2, but allowing the constants to depend on both x and y. This could give a worst-case analogue to Jeffrey conditioning or minimum relative entropy updating [4] .
Possible extensions would be to infinite outcome and message spaces. We are also interested in probability updating in sequential (online) interaction protocols [26] .
Other questions concern the comparison between different alternative approaches the contestant might use to update his probabilities. For example, can we bound the difference in expected loss between worst-case optimal and naive conditioning? What about ignoring the message and always predicting with the marginal, or ignoring the constraints imposed on the quizmaster by the marginal and predicting with the maximum entropy distribution on y? (Both these strategies are overly pessimistic.) Conversely, we might wonder how much the contestant loses by playing a worst-case optimal strategy when the quizmaster is not adversarial, but for instance chooses from the available messages uniformly at random. In this context it is also of interest how to resolve the problem of non-unique worst-case optimal strategies in a principled way.
Proof of Lemma 2. If P(y 2 ) = 0 then P = P and the result is trivial; if P(y 2 ) > 0 but P(y 1 ) = 0, then P(· | y 2 ) = P (· | y 1 ) so P and P have the same expected generalized entropy. Otherwise P(· | y 1 ) and P(· | y 2 ) are well-defined, and P (· | y 1 ) = (P(y 1 )P(· | y 1 ) + P(y 2 )P(· | y 2 ))/(P(y 1 ) + P(y 2 )) is a convex combination of them. By concavity of
Proof of Theorem 3. Rockafellar [17, Theorem 27.3] gives conditions under which a convex minimization problem has a solution attaining the minimum. These are satisfied by P and −H L : P is nonempty, closed, convex, and bounded (thus has no direction of recession), and −H L is convex (Lemma 1), finite for all P ∈ P (thus proper), and lower semi-continuous (thus closed).
By Rockafellar [17, Corollary 28.2.2], a KT-vector λ * exists, so that for the remaining claims of the theorem, it suffices to show that P * is worst-case optimal and λ * is a KT-vector if and only if the given conditions on (P * , λ * ) hold. To prove this, we rewrite the maximin problem to a convex optimization problem where P may range
, a strict superset of P. In this larger set, P(x | y) := P(x, y)/P(y) still defines a conditional probability distribution for y with P(y) > 0, because any scale factor cancels out.
The following function extends the quizmaster's objective function (5) (the expected generalized entropy of P ∈ P) to the domain R R(X,Y) ≥0
:
Using this concave function (infimum of linear functions), the convex optimization problem is given by maximize f 0 (P) subject to y x P(x, y) = p x for all x ∈ X,
. By Rockafellar [17, Theorem 28.3] , P * ∈ R R(X,Y) ≥0 maximizes this and λ * ∈ R X is a KT-vector if and only if P * ∈ P and at P * , the zero vector is a supergradient to
The term being subtracted is linear, with gradientλ ∈ R R(X,Y)
given bȳ
By Rockafellar [17, Theorem 23.8] , 0 is a supergradient to (A.1) if and only ifλ is a supergradient to f 0 at P * . For any P * that is not everywhere zero, we have for all c ≥ 0 that f 0 (cP * ) = c f 0 (P * ), so that a supporting hyperplane to f 0 at any P * ∈ P must go through the origin. Then the supporting hyperplane with gradientλ has as defining equation the linear expression x,y P(x, y)λ x,y .
If x,y P(x, y)λ x,y defines a supporting hyperplane to f 0 at P * , then
1. at every y ∈ Y with P * (y) > 0, it is a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P * (· | y), and 2. for every y with P * (y) = 0, H L (P ) ≤ x P (x)λ x,y for all P ∈ ∆ y .
The converse also holds: we have for all y ∈ Y and P ∈ ∆ y that H L (P ) ≤ x∈y P λ x,y , with equality if P * (y) > 0 and P = P * (· | y); taking the convex combination with coefficients P * (y) shows that the hyperplane defined by x,y P(x, y)λ x,y is nowhere below f 0 and touches it at P = P * . Forλ of the required form (A.2), this is in turn equivalent to the characterization given in the statement of the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 4. The function x∈y λ x P(x) − H L (P) attains its minimum d on ∆ y at some P [17, Theorem 27.3] . Let λ ∈ Λ y be given by λ x = λ x − d for all x ∈ y: this defines a hyperplane to H L ∆ y that is supporting at the minimizing P, proving the first part of the lemma.
For the third part, let λ, λ and P be as described. λ ≤ λ implies P λ ≤ P λ. Neither can be smaller than H L (P), and since the right hand side must equal H L (P) because λ is supporting at P, so must the left hand side, showing that λ is also supporting at P. If P(x) = 1 for some x ∈ y, then P λ = λ x for any λ , so in particular λ x = λ x = H L (P). For other P ∈ ∆ y , we use that two linear functions obeying an inequality on their domain D := ∆ {x∈y|P(x)>0} and coinciding at a point in the relative interior of D must coincide everywhere on D, so that again λ x = λ x for x ∈ y with P(x) > 0.
It remains to show that given such a λ, a minimal λ ≤ λ exists in Λ y . Consider the set Λ := {λ ∈ Λ y | λ ≤ λ}. The set of supporting hyperplanes to H L ∆ y at P in Λ y is closed [17, Section 23 , definition subdifferential (page 215)]; Λ is a subset of this set (as we just saw), obtained by adding further non-strict linear constraints, so it too is closed. It also has the property that if λ ∈ Λ is minimal in that set, it is also minimal in Λ y . Now fix any P in the relative interior of ∆ y , and pick some λ ∈ Λ that minimizes P λ (this minimum must be attained because the expression is bounded below and Λ is closed). Such a λ is also minimal in the partial order, so it is the element we are looking for.
Proof of Theorem 5. Take a worst-case optimal strategy P * for the quizmaster and KT-vector λ * . For each y ∈ Y, define a vector
for x ∈ y 0 for x y.
By the statement of Theorem 3, λ ∈ Λ y . Let λ be a minimal element of Λ y with λ ≤ λ : such an element exists by parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 4. (If λ is itself minimal, λ = λ ). By assumption, λ is realizable on y. Let Q * |y be given by this Q. By playing this Q * , the contestant will achieve expected loss (against any strategy P ∈ P for the quizmaster, for λ * any KT-vector)
The right-hand side is the maximum loss the quizmaster can achieve in the maximin game. By (7), the reverse inequality also holds, so we find that the values of the minimax and maximin games must be equal. function f : R X → R at the point P ∈ R X with f (P) = P λ if and only if the hypograph of f is a subset of H λ .
A column vector (−αλ, α) is called normal to a convex set C at a point (P, z) ∈ C if (P − P, z − z) (−αλ, α) ≤ 0 for all (P , z ) ∈ C [17] ; that is, if C ⊆ {(P , z ) | (P − P, z − z) (−αλ, α) ≤ 0}. This latter set is equal to H λ if α > 0 and z = P λ. So if C is the hypograph of f and f (P) = z = P λ, then λ is a supporting hyperplane to f at P if and only if (−λ, 1) is normal to C.
The set of all vectors normal to C at (P, z) is called the normal cone at (P, z). The normal cone to H λ at given (P, P λ) is the half-line
For L randomized 0-1 loss, let the function f 0 : R X → R be given by f 0 (P) = min Q∈∆ X x ∈X P(x )L(x , Q); note that f 0 ∆ X = H L , and that for all y ∈ Y, any minimal supporting hyperplane λ ∈ Λ y to H L ∆ y can be extended to a supporting hyperplane λ to f 0 with λ x = λ x for all x ∈ y.
The hypograph of f 0 is C = x∈X H λ (x) , with λ
where e x is the distribution that puts all mass on x). By Rockafellar [17, Corollary 23.8 .1], for C of this form and (P, z) a point on the boundary of C, the normal cone of C at (P, z) is the sum of the individual normal cones. The normal cone of any set at a point in the interior of that set is just {0}, so we can ignore those halfspaces when determining the normal cone. Then the corollary says that any vector (−λ, 1) normal to f 0 at (P, f 0 (P)) can be written as x∈X:P λ (x) = f 0 (P) (−α x λ (x) , α x ): λ is a convex combination of those λ
. Conclusion: any minimal supporting hyperplane λ to H L ∆ y at P ∈ ∆ y with randomized 0-1 loss is a convex combination of the hyperplanes realized by hard 0-1 loss that are supporting at P. Therefore, randomizing allows the contestant to realize λ.
Proof of Theorem 7. From Theorem 5, we know that a strategy exists for the contestant that achieves loss x p x λ * x where λ * is any KT-vector, and that this is worst-case optimal. Hence Q * is worst-case optimal if and only if it achieves the same worst-case expected loss. The worst-case expected loss of a strategy Q ∈ Q is max P∈P x,y
Therefore if for all x, y with x ∈ y, we have L(x, Q |y ) ≤ λ * x for some KT-vector λ * , Q is worst-case optimal.
For the converse, pick any Q ∈ Q and suppose that the vector given by λ x := max y L(x, Q |y ) is not a KT-vector. Then by Theorem 3, there is no P ∈ P such that P and λ satisfy the conditions of that theorem. Equivalently, for all P ∈ P, there either is a message y such that the hyperplane defined by λ passes below H L somewhere in ∆ y , or there is a message y with P(y) > 0 but the hyperplane lies strictly above H L at P(· | y). The former contradicts the definition of H L , so for λ not a KT-vector, the latter must be the case. But then against any P ∈ P (in particular against worst-case optimal P), there is a different strategy Q ∈ Q that is equal to Q except for its response to the message y: Q |y realizes a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P(· | y). This strategy Q obtains strictly smaller expected loss than Q, so Q is not worst-case optimal. (In other words: in a Nash equilibrium (P * , Q * ), the contestant can only do worse against P * by changing strategy, but here he can do better.)
Proof of Lemma 8. For proper loss functions, L and H L are related as follows: at all y ∈ Y and P ∈ ∆ y , if the vector λ = L(·, P) is finite at all x ∈ y, it describes the nonvertical hyperplane realized by P, which is a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P.
Now suppose that at some P ∈ ∆ y , there exists a minimal supporting hyperplane λ ∈ Λ y other than λ := L(· | P), the supporting hyperplane realized by P (here we allow vertical hyperplanes, for which λ may include infinities). Let x ∈ y be an outcome where λ x < λ x , which exists by minimality of λ . Write e x for the probability distribution that puts all mass on this outcome, and define P α := (1 − α)P + αe x for α ∈ (0, 1]. For each of these points P α , the hyperplane L(·, P α ) realized by P α is at most as high as λ at P α (because L(·, P α ) is supporting there) and at least as high as λ at P (where λ is supporting), so L(x, P α ) is bounded away from λ x by λ x : L(x, P α ) ≤ λ x < λ x . Therefore lim α↓0 L(x, P α ) L(x, P), and L is not continuous. For L proper and continuous, this proves the 'at most one' part of the lemma.
For the 'exactly one' part: by Rockafellar [17, Theorem 23.3 ], a nonvertical supporting hyperplane may only fail to exist at P if there is a line segment through P falling inside ∆ y on one side of P and outside on the other; that is, for P on the relative boundary of ∆ y .
Finally, suppose that λ = L(·, P) (the hyperplane realized by P) is finite at all x ∈ y but not minimal. Then by Lemma 4, a different minimal supporting hyperplane λ exists at P, which by the above gives a contradiction. This shows that if λ is finite, it is the minimal supporting hyperplane.
Proof of Theorem 9. Theorem 3 applies, showing existence of a KT-vector and a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster.
A worst-case optimal Q * exists and forms a Nash equilibrium with P * : For each y ∈ Y and each P ∈ ∆ y , by Lemma 8 there is at most one minimal supporting hyperplane at P which is then realized by Q = P. So all minimal supporting hyperplanes are realizable on y, and Theorem 5 applies.
Next we show that the characterization of P * and λ * in Theorem 3 is equivalent to the one in this theorem. We consider y with P * (y) > 0 first. If P * is a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster λ * defines a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P * (· | y), then by Lemma 4 there exists a minimal λ ∈ Λ y which is also supporting at P * (· | y) and which satisfies λ x ≤ λ x for x ∈ y, with equality for P * (x | y) > 0. By Lemma 8, λ x = L(·, P * (· | y)) for all x ∈ y, showing that the conditions of this theorem hold. Conversely, if λ * satisfies the equality in this theorem, then x∈y 
For y with P * (y) = 0, if the hyperplane defined by λ * is nowhere below H L ∆ y as in Theorem 3, then using Lemma 4 it can be lowered to become a minimal supporting hyperplane, for which a realizing Q Characterization of Q * : By Theorem 7, Q * is worst-case optimal for the contestant if and only if the (unique) KT-vector equals the left-hand side of (9) . Similarly, if a strategy P * is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster, then the KT-vector equals the right-hand side of (9) . Therefore: if for given Q * a worst-case optimal P * exists for which (9) holds, then both sides equal the KT-vector and Q * is worst-case optimal; if Q * is worst-case optimal, then (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P * ; and if, for given Q * , (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P * , then it holds for at least one worst-case optimal P * by the existence of worst-case optimal P * .
Proof of Theorem 10. For local L, by definition L(x, Q) = f x (Q(x)) for some sequence of functions f x : [0, 1] → [0, ∞]. Given a point P ∈ ∆ y , the vector λ given by λ x = f x (P(x)) defines a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P, because L is proper. Each f x is nonincreasing. (To see this, consider moving the point P along any line that goes through the vertex of the simplex ∆ X which puts all mass on some x. Because H L is concave along this line, the farther away P is from that vertex, the higher a supporting hyperplane to H L at P will be at that vertex.)
Given P * and q satisfying the conditions in this theorem, let λ * x be f x (q x ) for each x ∈ X. We show that P * is worst-case optimal by verifying that P * and λ * satisfy Theorem 3. For each y with P * (y) > 0, λ * defines a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P * (· | y). For each other y, consider a supporting hyperplane to
x , the hyperplane defined by λ * is everywhere at least as high as this supporting hyperplane, as required. For the converse: For strictly concave H L , f x is strictly decreasing. Define functions g x as follows:
If f x is continuous, g x is just the ordinary inverse of f x , but if f x has a jump discontinuity at q, there will be an interval where g x is constantly equal to q. In either case, g x satisfies g x ( f x (q)) = q for all q ∈ [0, 1].
Take P * some worst-case optimal strategy, and λ * a KT-vector. Define q ∈ [0, 1]
. We use Theorem 3 to show that q satisfies (10). For each y ∈ Y, let λ ∈ Λ y be a minimal supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y that obeys λ ≤ λ * ; such a λ exists by Lemma 4. Let Q |y be the (unique) point at which λ supports H L ∆ y . It satisfies f x (Q |y (x)) = λ x , from which it follows that g x (λ x ) = g x ( f x (Q |y (x))) = Q |y (x). Applying g x to both sides of λ x ≤ λ * x , we get Q |y (x) ≥ q x for all x ∈ y, so that x∈y q x ≤ x∈y Q |y (x) = 1. If P * (y) > 0, then the hyperplane defined by λ * is itself a supporting hyperplane and Q |y is the point where it touches H L ∆ y , namely the point P * (· | y). Because Q |y (x) also satisfies Q |y (x) = g x (λ * x ) = q x , the equality q x = Q |y (x) = P * (x | y) follows.
Proof of Lemma 11. At least one vector q must exist because for the game with logarithmic loss and X, Y, p as in the lemma, a worst-case optimal strategy P * must exist by Theorem 3, and an associated RCAR vector q must exist for it by Theorem 10 using that H L is strictly concave.
For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q and KT-vector λ * are related by λ * x = − log q x . By Theorem 3, any strategy P ∈ P that does not agree with the KT-vector λ * is not worst-case optimal, showing that q is unique.
Proof of Lemma 13. We will show that any nonvertical supporting hyperplane λ ∈ Λ y is supporting at no more than one point P ∈ ∆ y . By Lemma 4, if a supporting hyperplane exists at P, then a minimum supporting hyperplane also exists at that point, so it suffices to restrict our attention to minimal λ ∈ Λ y . We know that such a λ is realizable on y; let Q be a distribution realizing it. Then Q minimizes the expected loss against any P at which λ supports H L ∆ y . For strictly proper L, there can be at most one such P, proving strict concavity.
Proof of Lemma 14. The generalized entropy function of L is given by
where a ∈ R >0 and b ∈ R X are the constants in the affine transformation (12) . H L is again finite and continuous. If P * is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in game G, then by Theorem 3 there exists a KT-vector λ * satisfying that theorem's conditions. Define a transformed vector by λ = aλ * + b. This is a KT-vector for G , showing that P * is also worst-case optimal in that game. If the conditions of Theorem 5 hold for G, then they also holds for G : If λ is a minimal supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y , then λ = (1/a)(λ − b) is a minimal supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y . By assumption, λ is realizable on y in game G, say by Q ∈ ∆ X . Then the same Q also realizes λ in game G .
If Q * is worst-case optimal for the contestant in G, then by Theorem 7, λ given by λ x := max y x L(x, Q * |y ) is a KT-vector. The transformed vector λ = aλ + b is then a KT-vector in G , so that by Theorem 7, Q * is worst-case optimal in that game. Because the affine transformation from L into L can be reversed by a second affine transformation (with a = 1/a and b = −(1/a)b), the reverse implications follow.
Proof of Lemma 16. For each y ∈ Y, assume without loss of generality that y ∈ Y 1 . Then observe that the generalized entropies for G and G 1 are identical on ∆ y ; P * (y) > 0 if and only if P * 1 (y) > 0; and P * (x | y) = P * 1 (x | y) for all x ∈ y. Now the claim follows from Theorem 3. 
, and 0 elsewhere. Because L is symmetric between x 1 and
; then we must have λ
is impossible, and we find λ *
Proof of Theorem 18. For graph games, all loss functions are essentially local. We will make this precise by constructing functions f x , analogous to those in the proof of Theorem 10: they have the property that for all y ∈ Y, a supporting hyperplane to H L ∆ y at P ∈ ∆ y is given by λ with λ x = f x (P(x)) for all x ∈ y. (Note that we may not get f x (Q(x)) = L(x, Q) as in the case of local proper loss functions in the proof of Theorem 10, because the hyperplane realized by Q may not be supporting at Q if L is improper.)
For each x ∈ X, if the only message in which x occurs is {x}, then f x (q) is only defined for q = 1, where it is f x (1) = H L (e x ) (where e x is the unique element of ∆ y ). For other x, pick any message y ∈ Y with y x and |y| = 2. For all these y, the generalized entropies H L ∆ y are identical copies of the same function, by symmetry of L. For each q ∈ [0, 1], pick a supporting hyperplane λ to H L ∆ y at the unique P ∈ ∆ y with P(x) = q, and let f x (q) = λ x . If H L is not differentiable at P (including when q ∈ {0, 1}), we can choose a supporting hyperplane arbitrarily as long as the same one is used to define f x (q) and f x (1 − q) wherever {x, x } ∈ Y. (In particular this means that if a connected component of Y viewed as a graph contains an odd cycle, f x (1/2) must take the same value for all x in that component.)
As for local L, each f x is nonincreasing because H L is concave, and f x is strictly decreasing if H L is strictly concave. The rest of the proof is the same as for Theorem 10.
Proof of Theorem 19. We know from Theorem 10 that a quizmaster strategy P * is worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss if and only if it is RCAR, and from Theorem 3 that such a P * exists. Take any such P * . Let λ be the KT-vector with respect to logarithmic loss, and Y P * = {y ∈ Y | P * (y) > 0}. For any pair y ∈ Y P * , y ∈ Y, we will show that there exists a bijection π from y \ y to y \ y such that λ x ≤ λ π(x) for all x ∈ y \ y . This follows from Schrijver [21, Corollary 39.12a], but here we give a direct proof by induction on |y \ y|:
• |y \ y| = 1: Apply Lemma 17 to y 1 = y and y 2 = y (using that for an RCAR strategy, P * (y 1 ) > 0 implies P * (x 1 , y 1 ) > 0 for all x 1 ∈ y 1 ) to find the required inequality.
• |y \ y| > 1: Let y 1 = y and pick any x 1 ∈ y \ y . Starting with i = 1, apply the basis exchange property on y \ {x i } and y i to find x i (it will be in y i \ y ⊆ y ); then apply it again on y i \ {x i } and y to find x i+1 ∈ y \ y i , defining the message y i+1 = y i \ {x i } ∪ {x i+1 } (which may not be in Y P * ). Continue until x i+1 = x 1 . Now π defined by π(x 1 ) = x 1 , . . . , π(x i ) = x i is a bijection from {x 1 , . . . , x i } = (y ∩ y i+1 ) \ y ⊆ y \ y to {x 1 , . . . , x i } = y \ y i+1 ⊆ y \ y (to see this, note that an element x j found in the basis exchange from y is then removed from y j+1 so that it will not be found again; an element x j+1 found in the other basis exchange is added to y j+1 with the same result), and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ i, applying Lemma 17 to y and y ∪ {x j } \ {x j } tells us that λ x j ≤ λ x j as required. If y i+1 = y, then this is the bijection we are looking for; otherwise, it can be completed by combining it with a bijection from y \ y i+1 to y i+1 \ y, which exists by the induction hypothesis.
If also y ∈ Y P * , a bijection π from y \ y to y \ y such that λ x ≤ λ π (x ) is found by the same argument. Together, π and π divide the outcomes in the two sets into disjoint cycles that must all have the same value for λ, defining an equivalence relation ∼ on y ⊕ y . For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q obeys q x = e −λ x , so it must also be constant within each equivalence class of ∼. Because the entropy of logarithmic loss is strictly concave, the conditionals of P A greedy algorithm that repeatedly increments some q x until none can be increased further, while maintaining the inequality x∈y q x ≤ 1 on each y, will terminate with a q satisfying the conditions stated at the beginning of the proof. This q will be unchanged and thus still be uniform on y 1 , while on the intersecting message y 2 , q also still sums to 1 but is not uniform.
For the case of uniform games, the construction is similar. Let k be the size of the game's messages. By Oxley [24, Corollary 2.1.5], a nonempty family of sets Y is the collection of bases of a matroid if and only if for all y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y and x 2 ∈ y 2 \ y 1 , y 1 ∪ {x 2 } \ {x 1 } ∈ Y for some x 1 ∈ y 1 \ y 2 .
(A.3)
Because our Y is not a matroid, it follows that there exist y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y and x 2 ∈ y 2 \ y 1 for which no corresponding x 1 exists. For k ≥ 3 (which holds because the game we consider is not a graph game), we claim something stronger: that there exist y 1 , y 2 , x 2 as above with the additional property that y 1 and y 2 intersect. The proof of this claim is below. Using such y 1 and x 2 and some 0 < < 1/k, initialize q as follows:
Because any message containing x 2 also contains at least one other outcome not in y 1 , we again have x∈y q x ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y. For k ≥ 3, the initial q has the property that the set of outcomes x for which q x cannot be increased further (we call these outcomes maximized) is connected by messages y with x∈y x = 1 (that is, the maximized outcomes cannot be partitioned into two nonempty sets such that each sum-1 message is contained in one of these sets); this is because y 1 has sum 1, and any other message with sum 1 must intersect y 1 . (For k = 2, this would not be the case: the only messages having sum 1 would be y 1 and all messages that contain x 2 , but y 1 would not intersect any of these.) We can have the greedy algorithm maintain this as an invariant: Because the game is connected, there is always a message partially in the set of maximized outcomes and partially outside. We call such a message a crossing message. Each round, we pick an outcome x that is not maximized yet and is contained in a crossing message; if x 2 is not maximized, we always pick x = x 2 (using that it is contained in the crossing message y 2 ). The tightest constraint on increasing q x will come from a crossing message, because for any noncrossing message y x, we have x ∈y\{x} q x = (k − 1)(1/k − ), which is the smallest possible value of this sum. So increasing q x as much as possible will cause a crossing message to get sum equal to 1. This message connects x to the set of previously maximized outcomes, and any other outcomes that were maximized by this increment must be contained in some message that also contains x.
When the greedy algorithm terminates, q will still be uniform on y 1 , while there will be another message on which q sums to one but is not uniform. (This may not be y 2 , which may not have sum 1.) Because all outcomes are connected by sum-1 messages, we can also find a pair of intersecting messages, one of which is uniform and one of which is not. Use these two messages as y 1 and y 2 in the sequel.
Having found, for both nonuniform and uniform games, a vector q and messages y 1 and y 2 as described above, we let strategy P be RCAR with vector q and P(y) uniform on {y | x∈y q x = 1}. This P is a worst-case optimal strategy for the game with logarithmic loss and marginal p x = y x P(x, y), and q is its unique RCAR vector.
We will show that P is not worst-case optimal for the game with the same marginal and Brier loss. Brier loss is proper and continuous, so by Theorem 9, L(x, P(· | y 1 )) = L(x, P(· | y 2 )) for worst-case optimal P. These are squared Euclidean distances from a vertex of the simplex to the predicted distribution. However, the equality will not hold for P:
Among all predictions in ∆ y i with Q(x) = q x for each x ∈ y 1 ∩ y 2 (this set of predictions is the intersection of ∆ y i with an affine subspace), the squared Euclidean distance L(x, Q) between such Q and given vertex x ∈ y 1 ∩ y 2 is uniquely minimized by Q uniform on the outcomes not in y 1 ∩ y 2 (this is the orthogonal projection of the vertex onto that subspace). For a uniform game, P(· | y 1 ) is uniform and thus L(x, P(· | y 1 )) equals this minimum; P(· | y 1 ) differs from the uniform distribution at some outcomes not in y 1 ∩ y 2 and thus L(x, P(· | y 2 )) is larger than the minimum.
For a nonuniform game, P(· | y 1 ) is uniform on y 1 \ y 2 and P(· | y 2 ) is uniform on y 2 \ y 1 , so both minimize the distance to the vertex in their respective subspaces. However, the subspace for y 2 is isomorphic to a subspace contained in the subspace for y 1 and not containing P(· | y 1 ). Therefore L(x, P(· | y 1 )) < L(x, P(· | y 2 )).
Proof of claim. Suppose for a contradiction that any pair of intersecting messages y, y obeys the above exchange property (A.3) for all x ∈ y \ y. Let y 1 , y 2 be two messages that fail (A.3) for some outcome x 2 ∈ y 2 \ y 1 ; it follows from our assumption that they are disjoint. Because Y is connected, there exists a sequence of messages starting with y 1 and ending with y 2 in which adjacent messages intersect. Using (A.3), we can extend this sequence to one where adjacent messages differ by the exchange of one outcome: given intersecting y, y ∈ Y with d := |y \ y| > 1, we find y ∈ Y with |y \ y| = 1 and |y \ y | = d − 1. Write the entire sequence as y 0 = y 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n = y 2 . We have n ≥ k, because n < k would imply that y 1 ∩ y 2 ∅. If n > k, we can find a shorter sequence as follows: pick 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n − k for which y i ∩ y j+1 ∅; this holds if j + 1 − i < k, so such i, j can always be found if k ≥ 3. Let x be the unique outcome in y j+1 \ y j .
• If x y j+k (intuitively, adding x leads us on a detour that can be avoided when going to y 
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Thus we can always find a sequence with n = k.
Given such a sequence y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n , we will now show a contradiction with the assumption that y 1 = y 0 and y 2 = y n fail (A.3) by showing that for any x 2 ∈ y 2 , a message exists that differs from y 1 by adding x 2 and removing one other outcome. If x 2 ∈ y 1 , then y 1 is such a message and we are done. Otherwise, we can apply (A.3) to y 1 and x 2 ∈ y 2 to find a message y containing x 2 ; because k ≥ 3, this message still intersects y 1 , so applying (A.3) to y 1 and x 2 ∈ y gives the message we are looking for. This shows by contradiction that if a connected uniform game with k ≥ 3 is not a matroid game, there exists a pair of intersecting messages y 1 , y 2 and an outcome x 2 ∈ y 2 \ y 1 that do not satisfy (A.3).
